TriliumNext MCP Server

A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for interacting with TriliumNext via its ETAPI. Enables LLMs to create, read, update, and organize notes — including embedding images and files directly into note content.

Contents

• Features
• Installation
• Configuration — CLI, env vars, config file
• Logging — what gets logged, where it goes, how to tune it
• Metrics — Prometheus /metrics endpoint, auth modes, exposed series
• Available Tools
• Embedding Images and Files
• Multi-tenant HTTP deployment — run one server for many users
  • Architecture
  • Quick start (Docker) / (local)
  • HTTP endpoints · Error responses · Request body size limits
  • Connecting clients — Claude Desktop, Claude Code, SDK
  • JWT / OIDC gateway auth · CORS · Rate limiting
  • StreamableHTTP transport — newer MCP transport alongside /sse
  • Per-tenant audit + metrics
  • SSRF configuration · Reverse-proxy
  • Security model · Troubleshooting
• Debugging with MCP Inspector
• Development — build, test, docker
• Getting an ETAPI Token

Features

• 19 tools across 8 categories for full note management, search, organization, attachments, revisions, and system operations (consolidated from 35 in v1 — see Migrating from v1)
• MCP tool annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, title) on every tool for better approval-dialog UX in clients that surface them
• Inline image and file embedding — attach images and files when creating or updating notes in a single tool call
• Data URL support — pass image/file data as raw base64 or data: URLs
• Four content modes on write_note — metadata, replace, append, and edit (search/replace or unified diff)
• Markdown support — write in markdown, stored as HTML automatically
• Image-aware content retrieval — get_note returns embedded images as MCP image blocks alongside the note body
• Support for STDIO, HTTP/SSE, and StreamableHTTP transports, including multi-tenant mode where each client brings its own Trilium URL + ETAPI token
• Pluggable gateway auth — none, shared-secret bearer, or JWT/OIDC (HS256 secrets + JWKS for RS256/ES256/EdDSA)
• CORS for browser-based MCP clients, in-process rate limiting per IP + per gateway token, and Prometheus metrics with optional per-principal labels
• Flexible configuration via CLI, environment variables, or config file
• TypeScript with full type safety

Installation

git clone https://github.com/perfectra1n/triliumnext-mcp
cd triliumnext-mcp
npm install
npm run build

Adding to Claude Code

claude mcp add trilium node /path/to/triliumnext-mcp/dist/index.js \
  --scope user \
  -e TRILIUM_TOKEN=<your_etapi_token> \
  -e TRILIUM_URL=<your_trilium_url_e.g._https://trilium.example.com/etapi>

This adds the server at user scope (available across all repositories) in your ~/.claude.json.

Configuration

Configuration precedence (highest to lowest):

1. CLI arguments
2. Environment variables
3. Configuration file (./trilium-mcp.json or ~/.trilium-mcp.json)
4. Default values

CLI Arguments

npm install -g .
triliumnext-mcp --url http://localhost:37740/etapi --token YOUR_TOKEN

Options:

• -u, --url <url> — Trilium ETAPI URL (default: http://localhost:37740/etapi)
• -t, --token <token> — Trilium ETAPI token (required in single-tenant mode)
• --transport <type> — Transport type: stdio or http (default: stdio)
• -p, --port <port> — HTTP server port when using http transport (default: 3000)
• --max-post-bytes <size> — max size of a single MCP JSON-RPC POST body on the SSE transport. Accepts raw bytes or suffixed values like 500mb / 1gb (default: 500mb). See Request body size limits.
• -h, --help — Show help message

Multi-tenant HTTP options (see Multi-tenant HTTP deployment below):

• --multi-tenant — each SSE client supplies its own Trilium URL + token
• --gateway-auth <mode> — none or bearer (default: bearer when multi-tenant)
• --gateway-token <token> — accepted bearer token (repeatable)
• --trilium-url-allowlist <hosts> — comma-separated allowed hostnames for client URLs
• --allow-private-urls — skip the private/loopback IP SSRF block

Environment Variables

export TRILIUM_URL=http://localhost:37740/etapi
export TRILIUM_TOKEN=your-etapi-token
export TRILIUM_TRANSPORT=stdio
export TRILIUM_HTTP_PORT=3000
export TRILIUM_MAX_POST_BYTES=500mb  # SSE POST body cap; see "Request body size limits"

# Multi-tenant (see section below):
export TRILIUM_MULTI_TENANT=true
export TRILIUM_GATEWAY_AUTH=bearer
export TRILIUM_GATEWAY_TOKENS=tok1,tok2
export TRILIUM_URL_ALLOWLIST=notes.example.com,trilium.internal
export TRILIUM_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=false

Config File

Create trilium-mcp.json in the current directory or ~/.trilium-mcp.json:

{
  "url": "http://localhost:37740/etapi",
  "token": "your-etapi-token",
  "transport": "stdio",
  "httpPort": 3000
}

For multi-tenant HTTP deployments, the same precedence applies (CLI > env > file > default). Multi-tenant keys:

{
  "transport": "http",
  "httpPort": 3000,
  "multiTenant": true,
  "gatewayAuth": "bearer",
  "gatewayTokens": ["pick-a-long-random-token"],
  "urlAllowlist": ["notes.example.com", "trilium.internal"],
  "allowPrivateUrls": false
}

Logging

The server emits one line per significant event — server startup, MCP tools/list, every tools/call (with timing and outcome), and every HTTP request when running over SSE. By default logs are human-readable text; flip to JSON for log shippers.

Where logs go

The output stream is chosen by transport, so logs never collide with the MCP wire protocol:

Transport	Log stream	Why
stdio	stderr	stdout is reserved by MCP for JSON-RPC frames — writing anything else there breaks clients.
http	stdout	The MCP protocol travels over HTTP, so stdout is free for logs. Easy to pipe into jq / a log shipper / docker logs.

Claude Desktop and Claude Code surface stdio servers' stderr in their MCP logs panel, so you'll see these events there with no extra setup.

Tuning

Two env vars (defaults shown):

Var	Values	Default	Effect
LOG_LEVEL	silent | error | warn | info | debug	info	info emits one line per tool call with timing and outcome. debug adds per-call argument summaries (with secrets and content blobs scrubbed). silent disables logging entirely.
LOG_FORMAT	text | json	text	text is <ISO-ts> LEVEL event k=v k=v lines. json is one JSON object per line.

Example output

info level, text format (the default):

2026-05-12T18:16:21.098Z INFO  server_started transport=stdio
2026-05-12T18:16:33.937Z INFO  http_request method=GET path=/health status=200 duration_ms=2 remote=::1
2026-05-12T18:16:40.512Z INFO  sse_connected session=2f1c... host=notes.example.com
2026-05-12T18:16:40.871Z INFO  list_tools session=2f1c... count=19
2026-05-12T18:16:41.044Z INFO  tool_call session=2f1c... tool=search_notes duration_ms=42 ok=true
2026-05-12T18:16:42.110Z INFO  tool_call session=2f1c... tool=get_note duration_ms=11 ok=false error=trilium status=404 code=NOT_FOUND
2026-05-12T18:16:55.802Z INFO  sse_closed session=2f1c...

LOG_FORMAT=json:

{"ts":"2026-05-12T18:16:41.044Z","level":"info","event":"tool_call","session":"2f1c...","tool":"search_notes","duration_ms":42,"ok":true}

The session field is identical across sse_connected, every tool_call on that connection, and sse_closed, so you can correlate tool activity to its SSE session and (in multi-tenant mode) to its Trilium host.

Event reference

Event	Level	Fields	When
server_started	info	transport, port?, mode?, gateway_auth?	After the listener is up (or stdio is connected).
startup_failed	error	err	Server failed to start.
list_tools	info	session, count	Client called tools/list.
tool_call	info	session, tool, duration_ms, ok, error?, code?, status?	One per tools/call. error is one of trilium | zod | diff | unknown_tool | unknown.
tool_call_args	debug	session, tool, args	Per call, before dispatch. args is shallow + redacted (secrets stripped, content blobs replaced with <string len=N>, scalars truncated at 64 chars).
http_request	info	method, path, status, duration_ms, remote	One per HTTP request to the SSE gateway. Path is pre-? to avoid logging query-string secrets.
sse_connected	info	session, host	New SSE connection accepted. host is the Trilium hostname (never the full URL or token).
sse_closed	info	session	SSE connection closed by either side.
sse_post	debug	session, bytes	Per POST /message, after body read.
sse_connect_failed	error	session, err	server.connect(transport) threw.
unauthorized	warn	remote	Gateway bearer check failed.
missing_trilium_credentials	warn	remote	Multi-tenant connect without X-Trilium-Url+X-Trilium-Token.
url_rejected	warn	reason	SSRF guard rejected the client URL.
trilium_auth_failed	warn	host, status, code	Trilium returned 401/403 to the connect-time probe.
trilium_validate_timeout	warn	host	Probe exceeded 10 s.
trilium_unreachable	warn	host, err	Trilium probe failed for any other reason.
allow_private_urls_enabled	warn	(none)	Operator started multi-tenant mode with --allow-private-urls.
request_handler_error	error	method, path, err	Unhandled error in the HTTP handler chain.

Event names match the JSON error strings returned to the HTTP client where applicable, so a grep for a failure mode finds both the log line and the response.

What's never logged

• ETAPI tokens, gateway bearer tokens, or any value of a field matching /token|password|secret|authorization|api[_-]?key/i
• Note bodies, attachment bytes, search results, or any field named content, text, body, data, attachment, blob, html, markdown — replaced with <string len=N> / <array len=N> / <object> shape descriptors at debug, omitted entirely at info
• Full Trilium URLs (which can theoretically embed credentials) — only the hostname is logged

Quick recipes

Silence the server (e.g. when invoking under a noisy test harness):

LOG_LEVEL=silent triliumnext-mcp --token "$TRILIUM_TOKEN"

Tee structured logs into a file while still seeing them in the terminal:

LOG_FORMAT=json triliumnext-mcp --transport http --token "$TRILIUM_TOKEN" \
  | tee >(jq -c . > /var/log/triliumnext-mcp.jsonl)

Find every failing tool call from the last run:

LOG_FORMAT=json triliumnext-mcp --transport http --token "$TRILIUM_TOKEN" \
  | jq -c 'select(.event=="tool_call" and .ok==false)'

Watch one tenant's activity in a multi-tenant deployment (correlate by SSE session id):

docker logs -f triliumnext-mcp | grep "session=2f1c"

Metrics

The server can expose a Prometheus-compatible GET /metrics endpoint on the SSE gateway. Off by default, opt in with --metrics or TRILIUM_METRICS=true. HTTP transport only — stdio mode has no listener, and the flag is ignored there with a warning.

Enabling

# Reuse the gateway bearer (default; same token that protects /sse)
node dist/index.js \
  --transport http \
  --multi-tenant \
  --gateway-token "$GATEWAY_TOKEN" \
  --metrics

Same thing via env:

TRILIUM_TRANSPORT=http \
TRILIUM_MULTI_TENANT=true \
TRILIUM_GATEWAY_TOKENS=$GATEWAY_TOKEN \
TRILIUM_METRICS=true \
  node dist/index.js

Auth modes

Selected with --metrics-auth <mode> or TRILIUM_METRICS_AUTH. Default is gateway.

Mode	What it does	When to use
gateway (default)	Scrapers must present the same Authorization: Bearer <token> accepted by /sse. Zero new config.	Common case. Prometheus uses the same secret as your MCP clients.
bearer	Scrapers must present a token from a separate list, supplied via --metrics-token <tok> (repeatable) or TRILIUM_METRICS_TOKENS=t1,t2. Gateway tokens are not accepted.	When you want Prometheus to have its own credential you can rotate independently of MCP client tokens.
none	Endpoint is open. No Authorization required.	The endpoint is firewalled or sits on a private network where you trust everything that can reach it.

If you ask for --metrics-auth gateway but --gateway-auth=none, there's no bearer to reuse — the server falls back to --metrics-auth=none and prints a startup warning so the behavior is explicit. If you set --metrics-auth bearer without providing any --metrics-token, startup fails fast.

Deploying with Docker / Compose

Add to docker-compose.multi-tenant.yml (already templated as commented-out entries in that file):

services:
  mcp-server:
    environment:
      - TRILIUM_METRICS=true
      # Default: reuse the gateway bearer. No new config needed.
      - TRILIUM_METRICS_AUTH=gateway
      # Or, give Prometheus its own rotatable credential:
      # - TRILIUM_METRICS_AUTH=bearer
      # - TRILIUM_METRICS_TOKENS=${PROMETHEUS_SCRAPE_TOKEN}

In Kubernetes, the equivalent is two env vars (TRILIUM_METRICS=true and TRILIUM_METRICS_AUTH) on the Deployment plus a ServiceMonitor with bearerTokenSecret pointing at the token Secret.

Reverse-proxy hardening

/metrics is served on the same listener and port as /sse (port 3000 by default). If you don't want public scrapers hammering the auth check, gate /metrics at the reverse proxy and only let your monitoring network through.

Caddy:

mcp.example.com {
    @metrics path /metrics
    handle @metrics {
        # only Prometheus can even reach /metrics; everyone else gets 404
        @allowed remote_ip 10.0.0.0/8 192.168.0.0/16
        handle @allowed {
            reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3000
        }
        respond 404
    }
    handle {
        reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3000 {
            flush_interval -1
        }
    }
}

nginx:

location = /metrics {
    allow 10.0.0.0/8;
    allow 192.168.0.0/16;
    deny all;
    proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3000;
}

This is defense-in-depth on top of the bearer auth — useful because metrics endpoints are routinely scanned by attackers, and a misconfigured --metrics-auth=none would otherwise leak operational data to anyone who finds the URL.

Sample Prometheus scrape config

scrape_configs:
  - job_name: triliumnext-mcp
    scheme: https
    static_configs:
      - targets: ['mcp.example.com']
    metrics_path: /metrics
    authorization:
      type: Bearer
      credentials: 'YOUR_GATEWAY_OR_METRICS_TOKEN'

Exposed series

All series are namespaced triliumnext_mcp_*. Histogram buckets are in seconds.

Series	Type	Labels	Notes
triliumnext_mcp_build_info	gauge	version	Always 1. Use for join-on-version queries.
triliumnext_mcp_http_requests_total	counter	method, path, status	path is normalized to /health | /sse | /message | /metrics | unknown to keep cardinality bounded.
triliumnext_mcp_http_request_duration_seconds	histogram	method, path	Buckets: 0.005, 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2.5, 5, 10.
triliumnext_mcp_tool_calls_total	counter	tool, ok, error	error is none on success, otherwise one of trilium, zod, diff, unknown_tool, unknown.
triliumnext_mcp_tool_call_duration_seconds	histogram	tool	Buckets: 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2.5, 5, 10, 30, 60.
triliumnext_mcp_sse_sessions	gauge	—	Current open SSE sessions.
triliumnext_mcp_sse_connects_total	counter	—	Successful SSE handshakes.
triliumnext_mcp_sse_closes_total	counter	—	SSE sessions closed by either side.
triliumnext_mcp_sse_connect_failures_total	counter	reason	reason ∈ unauthorized | missing_trilium_credentials | url_rejected | trilium_auth_failed | trilium_validate_timeout | trilium_unreachable | sse_connect_failed | server_misconfigured.
triliumnext_mcp_process_uptime_seconds	gauge	—	Synced from process.uptime() at scrape time.
triliumnext_mcp_process_resident_memory_bytes	gauge	—	Synced from process.memoryUsage().rss at scrape time.

Cardinality and what's intentionally NOT a label

• No session label. SSE session ids are unbounded and per-connection. Use logs (which carry session=…) for per-session investigation; use metrics for fleet-level rollups.
• No tenant / Trilium-host label. Same reason — and avoids putting tenant identifiers into a scrape surface that may have different access controls than the logs.
• No raw path for unknown routes. Random scanners / typo'd URLs collapse to unknown, so a probe storm can't blow up cardinality.

Useful PromQL

Tool error rate per tool:

sum by (tool) (rate(triliumnext_mcp_tool_calls_total{ok="false"}[5m]))
  /
sum by (tool) (rate(triliumnext_mcp_tool_calls_total[5m]))

p95 tool-call latency:

histogram_quantile(
  0.95,
  sum by (tool, le) (rate(triliumnext_mcp_tool_call_duration_seconds_bucket[5m]))
)

SSE connect failures by reason:

sum by (reason) (rate(triliumnext_mcp_sse_connect_failures_total[5m]))

Available Tools

The server exposes 19 tools, down from 35 in v1. The trim (see issue #6) improves reliability on clients that pre-load only a subset of a server's tools (claude.ai web, Cursor's 40-tool cap), and consolidates near-duplicate operations behind a mode or action discriminator. Destructive verbs (delete_*) stay as their own tools by design. See Migrating from v1 below for the old→new mapping.

Notes (5 tools)

Tool	Description
get_note	Read a note. Returns the body, metadata, and embedded images by default; pass include_content=false for metadata-only reads (e.g. tree navigation).
get_note_history	Get recent changes (creations, modifications, deletions) across the tree, with optional subtree filtering.
create_note	Create a note with title, content, type, and parent. Supports inline image/file embedding.
write_note	Write to a note via mode: "metadata" (title/type/mime), "replace" (overwrite content), "append" (concatenate), "edit" (search/replace or unified diff). Supports inline image/file embedding in replace/append modes.
delete_note	Delete or restore a note via required action: "delete" or "undelete".

Search & Discovery (2 tools)

Tool	Description
search_notes	Full-text and attribute search with filters, ordering, and limits.
get_note_tree	Get children of a note for tree navigation.

Organization (1 tool)

Tool	Description
organize_note	Reorganize the note tree via action: "move" (new parent), "clone" (appear under multiple parents), "reorder" (change positions), "unlink" (remove a branch — cascades to note deletion if it's the last branch).

Attributes & Labels (3 tools)

Tool	Description
get_attributes	Get all attributes of a note (pass noteId) or a single attribute by ID (pass attributeId).
set_attribute	Upsert an attribute on a note.
delete_attribute	Remove an attribute by ID.

Calendar & Journal (1 tool)

Tool	Description
get_special_note	Get the daily or inbox note via kind: "day" or "inbox" (optional date, defaults to today).

Attachments (4 tools)

Tool	Description
get_attachment	Read an attachment (pass attachmentId) or list a note's attachments (pass noteId). With attachmentId, the body is returned by default — images come back as MCP image blocks. Pass include_content=false when you only need metadata (e.g. checking size before pulling a large binary).
create_attachment	Create a new attachment (image or file) for a note.
write_attachment	Write to an attachment via mode: "metadata", "replace", or "edit".
delete_attachment	Delete an attachment.

Revisions (1 tool)

Tool	Description
get_revisions	Get note revisions. Pass noteId to list all revisions of a note; pass revisionId for a single revision with its HTML content (pass include_content=false for metadata-only).

System (2 tools)

Tool	Description
create_revision	Create a revision snapshot of a note.
manage_system	System ops via action: "backup" (create a DB backup by backupName) or "export" (export a note subtree as ZIP, returned base64-encoded).

Migrating from v1

The tool surface was consolidated in a breaking release. The mapping from the old 35-tool surface to the current 19-tool surface:

v1 tool	v2 equivalent
create_note	create_note (unchanged)
get_note	get_note with include_content=false
get_note_content	get_note (default include_content=true returns the body)
update_note	write_note with mode="metadata"
update_note_content	write_note with mode="replace" (or mode="edit" for search/replace and diff)
append_note_content	write_note with mode="append" (or mode="edit" for search/replace and diff)
delete_note	delete_note with action="delete" (required, no default)
undelete_note	delete_note with action="undelete"
get_note_attachments	get_attachment with noteId (list form)
get_note_history	get_note_history (unchanged)
search_notes	search_notes (unchanged)
get_note_tree	get_note_tree (unchanged)
move_note	organize_note with action="move"
clone_note	organize_note with action="clone"
reorder_notes	organize_note with action="reorder"
delete_branch	organize_note with action="unlink"
get_attributes	get_attributes with noteId
get_attribute	get_attributes with attributeId
set_attribute	set_attribute (unchanged)
delete_attribute	delete_attribute (unchanged)
get_day_note	get_special_note with kind="day"
get_inbox_note	get_special_note with kind="inbox"
create_attachment	create_attachment (unchanged)
get_attachment	get_attachment with include_content=false
get_attachment_content	get_attachment (default include_content=true returns the body)
update_attachment	write_attachment with mode="metadata"
update_attachment_content	write_attachment with mode="replace" or mode="edit"
delete_attachment	delete_attachment (unchanged)
get_note_revisions	get_revisions with noteId
get_revision	get_revisions with revisionId and include_content=false
get_revision_content	get_revisions with revisionId (default include_content=true returns the HTML body)
create_revision	create_revision (unchanged)
create_backup	manage_system with action="backup"
export_note	manage_system with action="export"
search_tools	dropped (with 19 tools, client-side discovery is no longer needed)

Embedding Images and Files

When creating or updating notes, you can embed images and files directly in a single tool call using the images and files parameters.

Image Embedding

Pass an images array and reference them in your content with image:0, image:1, etc.:

{
  "tool": "create_note",
  "arguments": {
    "parentNoteId": "root",
    "title": "My Note",
    "type": "text",
    "content": "<p>Here is a photo:</p><img src=\"image:0\">",
    "images": [
      {
        "data": "iVBORw0KGgo...",
        "mime": "image/png",
        "filename": "photo.png"
      }
    ]
  }
}

In markdown mode, use ![alt text](image:0):

{
  "content": "# My Note\n\n![photo](image:0)\n\nSome text.",
  "format": "markdown",
  "images": [{ "data": "iVBORw0KGgo...", "mime": "image/png", "filename": "photo.png" }]
}

Images without a matching placeholder are automatically appended at the end of the content.

File Embedding

Pass a files array and reference them with file:0, file:1, etc.:

{
  "content": "<p>Download the report: <a href=\"file:0\">Report PDF</a></p>",
  "files": [
    {
      "data": "JVBERi0xLjQ...",
      "mime": "application/pdf",
      "filename": "report.pdf"
    }
  ]
}

Files without a matching placeholder are appended as download links.

Data URL Support

The data field accepts both raw base64 and data URLs. When a data URL is provided, the MIME type is automatically extracted (overriding the mime field):

{
  "images": [
    {
      "data": "...",
      "mime": "ignored-when-data-url-is-used",
      "filename": "screenshot.png"
    }
  ]
}

Content Update Modes

The write_note tool selects behavior via mode:

1. "metadata" — update title/type/mime only (no content change)
2. "replace" — overwrite content entirely with content. Supports images/files embedding and markdown conversion.
3. "append" — fetch existing content and concatenate content at the end. Supports images/files embedding and markdown conversion.
4. "edit" — apply changes (array of {old_string, new_string}) OR patch (unified diff) to existing content. Operates on stored HTML; cannot be combined with format="markdown" or images/files.

write_attachment follows the same shape with "metadata", "replace", and "edit" modes.

Multi-tenant HTTP deployment

By default the server is single-tenant: TRILIUM_URL and TRILIUM_TOKEN are loaded once at startup and every MCP client that connects talks to the same Trilium instance. That's fine for a personal setup, but if you want to run one MCP server process that serves multiple users, each with their own Trilium and their own ETAPI token, switch it into multi-tenant mode.

What changes

With --multi-tenant:

1. Each SSE connection MUST supply its own Trilium credentials via HTTP headers, as an atomic pair:
   • X-Trilium-Url — the client's Trilium base URL
   • X-Trilium-Token — the client's ETAPI token
2. A per-connection TriliumClient is created — connections are isolated; one user's tool calls never hit another's Trilium.
3. Credentials are verified at connect time by calling /etapi/app-info (with a 10s timeout). A bad token fails fast with a 401 on the SSE handshake, not with silent tool-call errors later.
4. A gateway bearer token is required (--gateway-auth bearer, enabled by default in multi-tenant mode). Clients authenticate to you with a shared secret you hand out.
5. Client-supplied URLs are SSRF-checked. By default, hostnames that resolve to private/loopback/link-local IPs (including cloud metadata 169.254.169.254) are rejected. Adjust with --trilium-url-allowlist or --allow-private-urls.

Startup-supplied TRILIUM_URL / TRILIUM_TOKEN are rejected in multi-tenant mode. The server will refuse to start if either is set alongside --multi-tenant. This prevents a subtle token-leak where a client sending only one header would cause the operator's default to be mixed with client-supplied values.

Architecture

                  ┌───────────────────────────────────┐
   Client A ─────►│ /sse                              │   ┌────────────────┐
   (Auth: Bearer  │   1. gateway bearer check          │──►│ Trilium A      │
    X-Trilium-*)  │   2. SSRF guard on X-Trilium-Url  │   │ (notes-a.tld)  │
                  │   3. validate via /etapi/app-info │   └────────────────┘
   Client B ─────►│   4. new TriliumClient (per conn) │   ┌────────────────┐
                  │   5. new MCP Server (per conn)    │──►│ Trilium B      │
                  │                                   │   │ (notes-b.tld)  │
   Client N ─────►│ sessions: Map<sessionId, Session> │   └────────────────┘
                  │                                   │           ...
                  │ POST /message?sessionId=<uuid>    │
                  │   routes to the right session     │
                  │                                   │
                  │ GET /health  (no auth)            │
                  └───────────────────────────────────┘

Each SSE connection owns an independent Server + TriliumClient. Tool handlers close over the client, so tenant isolation is a property of the code, not something to enforce per-request.

Quick start (Docker)

export MCP_GATEWAY_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
docker compose -f docker-compose.multi-tenant.yml up -d

Distribute MCP_GATEWAY_TOKEN to authorized clients. Put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, Traefik) in front of this container — bearer tokens in plaintext HTTP are unsafe.

Quick start (local)

npm run build
node dist/index.js \
  --transport http \
  --port 3000 \
  --multi-tenant \
  --gateway-token "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"

HTTP endpoints

Method	Path	Auth	Purpose
GET	/health	none	Liveness probe — returns {"status":"ok"}.
GET	/sse	gateway + per-connection	Open an SSE stream. Server replies with an endpoint event containing /message?sessionId=<uuid>.
POST	/message	implicit via sessionId	Client sends JSON-RPC messages here. Content-Type: application/json, up to 1 MB.

Connecting clients

Any MCP client that can attach custom HTTP headers to an SSE connection will work.

Smoke test with curl:

curl -N \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MCP_GATEWAY_TOKEN" \
  -H "X-Trilium-Url: https://notes.example.com" \
  -H "X-Trilium-Token: $YOUR_ETAPI_TOKEN" \
  http://mcp-server.example.com:3000/sse

On success you'll see the endpoint SSE event, followed by message events as your client POSTs to /message.

Claude Desktop via mcp-remote:

Claude Desktop speaks stdio, so bridge it through mcp-remote which can carry custom headers to a remote SSE server. Add to claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "trilium": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "mcp-remote",
        "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
        "--header", "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_GATEWAY_TOKEN",
        "--header", "X-Trilium-Url: https://notes.example.com",
        "--header", "X-Trilium-Token: YOUR_ETAPI_TOKEN"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Claude Code (native SSE):

claude mcp add trilium --scope user \
  --transport sse https://mcp.example.com/sse \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_GATEWAY_TOKEN" \
  --header "X-Trilium-Url: https://notes.example.com" \
  --header "X-Trilium-Token: YOUR_ETAPI_TOKEN"

TypeScript SDK:

import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js';
import { SSEClientTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/sse.js';

const transport = new SSEClientTransport(new URL('https://mcp.example.com/sse'), {
  requestInit: {
    headers: {
      Authorization: `Bearer ${GATEWAY_TOKEN}`,
      'X-Trilium-Url': 'https://notes.example.com',
      'X-Trilium-Token': ETAPI_TOKEN,
    },
  },
});
const client = new Client({ name: 'my-app', version: '1.0.0' });
await client.connect(transport);

StreamableHTTP transport

In addition to the older HTTP+SSE transport (GET /sse + POST /message), this server exposes the newer StreamableHTTP transport at GET|POST|DELETE /mcp on the same port. StreamableHTTP is the direction MCP is heading — single endpoint, session id in a header instead of a query string, optional resumability via Last-Event-ID. Both transports run side-by-side; clients can pick whichever the SDK they ship supports.

Initialize handshake (POST /mcp):

curl -X POST https://mcp.example.com/mcp \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "X-Trilium-Url: https://notes.example.com" \
  -H "X-Trilium-Token: $ETAPI_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize",
       "params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},
                 "clientInfo":{"name":"my-app","version":"1.0.0"}}}'

The response carries an MCP-Session-Id header. Subsequent requests echo it back:

curl -X POST https://mcp.example.com/mcp \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "MCP-Session-Id: <sid>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/list"}'

DELETE /mcp with the session id closes the session cleanly. The gateway-auth / SSRF / rate-limit / Trilium-validation pipeline is identical to /sse — switching transports never changes the security surface.

TypeScript SDK:

import { StreamableHTTPClientTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/streamableHttp.js';

const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(new URL('https://mcp.example.com/mcp'), {
  requestInit: {
    headers: {
      Authorization: `Bearer ${TOKEN}`,
      'X-Trilium-Url': 'https://notes.example.com',
      'X-Trilium-Token': ETAPI_TOKEN,
    },
  },
});
const client = new Client({ name: 'my-app', version: '1.0.0' });
await client.connect(transport);

JWT / OIDC gateway auth

For per-user identity, use --gateway-auth jwt instead of bearer. Tokens are validated for signature, expiration (exp), not-before (nbf), and (optionally) issuer + audience. The authenticated principal claim (default sub) is threaded into every audit log line and — opt-in — into metric labels.

HS256 shared secret(s):

node dist/index.js \
  --transport http \
  --multi-tenant \
  --gateway-auth jwt \
  --jwt-secret "$JWT_SHARED_SECRET" \
  --jwt-issuer "https://idp.example.com" \
  --jwt-audience "mcp-gateway"

--jwt-secret is repeatable so you can roll secrets: deploy the new one alongside the old, then drop the old once all issuers have rotated.

RS256 / ES256 / EdDSA via JWKS:

node dist/index.js \
  --transport http --multi-tenant \
  --gateway-auth jwt \
  --jwt-jwks-url "https://idp.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json" \
  --jwt-issuer "https://idp.example.com" \
  --jwt-audience "mcp-gateway"

The JWKS URL is fetched on demand and cached; key rotation works automatically as the IdP publishes new keys.

Customize the principal claim:

--jwt-principal-claim email   # use the email claim instead of sub

Env equivalents: TRILIUM_JWT_SECRETS (CSV), TRILIUM_JWT_JWKS_URL, TRILIUM_JWT_ISSUER, TRILIUM_JWT_AUDIENCE, TRILIUM_JWT_PRINCIPAL_CLAIM. Validation: --gateway-auth jwt requires at least one secret OR a JWKS URL, else startup fails.

Algorithms accepted (default set): HS256 HS384 HS512 RS256 RS384 RS512 ES256 ES384 EdDSA. alg=none is always rejected.

CORS

Off by default. For browser-based clients, allow specific origins:

--cors-origin https://app.example.com --cors-origin https://admin.example.com
# or wildcard (echoes Origin so credentials still work):
--cors-origin '*'

Env: TRILIUM_CORS_ORIGINS=https://a.example.com,https://b.example.com. Preflight (OPTIONS) responses allow Authorization, X-Trilium-Url, X-Trilium-Token, MCP-Session-Id, and Content-Type by default. The server never emits literal Allow-Origin: * even in wildcard mode — it always echoes the request Origin, because browsers reject wildcards with credentials.

Rate limiting

In-process token-bucket limiter, applied per remote IP and per gateway bearer/JWT token (whichever appears in Authorization). Both axes are enforced independently — exceeding either limit returns 429 rate_limited with a Retry-After header.

--rate-limit-rps 10 --rate-limit-burst 30

Env: TRILIUM_RATE_LIMIT_RPS, TRILIUM_RATE_LIMIT_BURST. /health is never rate-limited (cheap liveness). /metrics is rate-limited like everything else.

This is in-process, not a Redis-backed distributed limiter — multi-replica deployments should also limit at the reverse proxy, with this server's limits as defense-in-depth.

Per-tenant audit + metrics

With --gateway-auth jwt, every audit log line carries the authenticated principal field — both tool_call and mcp_session_opened/sse_connected events. That gives you per-user tool usage in your log shipper without any extra work.

For Prometheus, the per-principal counter is opt-in for cardinality safety:

--metrics --metrics-include-principal

Env: TRILIUM_METRICS_INCLUDE_PRINCIPAL=true. When on, a new series appears:

# HELP triliumnext_mcp_tool_calls_by_principal_total Per-principal tool invocation counter…
# TYPE triliumnext_mcp_tool_calls_by_principal_total counter
triliumnext_mcp_tool_calls_by_principal_total{principal="alice@example.com",tool="search_notes",ok="true",error="none"} 12

Cardinality scales as principals × tools × outcomes. Only enable when your principal namespace is bounded (e.g., a known IdP user list). The base tool_calls_total series stays principal-free and is always safe to enable.

SSRF configuration

Flag	Behavior
(default)	Reject any X-Trilium-Url whose hostname resolves to a private / loopback / link-local / CGNAT / multicast address.
--trilium-url-allowlist host1,host2	Only hostnames matching the list (exact or suffix — example.com matches a.example.com) are accepted. Takes precedence over the private-IP block.
--allow-private-urls	Disable the private-IP block entirely. Use only on trusted/homelab networks.

Error responses

All errors are application/json with an error string. Common responses on GET /sse:

Status	error value	Meaning
401	unauthorized	Missing or wrong Authorization: Bearer.
401	missing_trilium_credentials	X-Trilium-Url and X-Trilium-Token are required together; one or both missing.
401	trilium_auth_failed	Trilium rejected the ETAPI token.
400	url_rejected (reason varies)	Bad scheme, embedded credentials, private IP (no allowlist), or not in allowlist.
502	trilium_unreachable	Can't reach the Trilium host at all.
504	trilium_validate_timeout	getAppInfo probe exceeded 10 s (suggests a black-hole or slow host).

On POST /message:

Status	error value	Meaning
400	missing_session_id	No ?sessionId= query parameter.
400	invalid_json	Body wasn't valid JSON.
404	unknown_session	sessionId doesn't match any live SSE connection (typical after a disconnect / restart).
413	payload_too_large	Body exceeded --max-post-bytes (default 500 MB). See Request body size limits.

Request body size limits

The HTTP/SSE transport caps each MCP JSON-RPC POST body at 500 MB by default. Tune it with --max-post-bytes <size> or TRILIUM_MAX_POST_BYTES (e.g. 100mb, 2gb, or a raw byte count). On stdio there is no equivalent cap — your shell / OS pipe buffers are the limit.

Why this exists, and a few caveats worth knowing:

• The MCP SDK has its own internal 4 MB cap inside handlePostMessage. To honor anything larger, this server reads and JSON-parses the request body itself before handing it off, bypassing the SDK's read. If you fork or upgrade and bodies start failing at ~4 MB with 400 from the SDK, this read-and-pass-through is what's missing.
• Bodies are buffered in memory before dispatch. A 500 MB cap means a single connection can ask for 500 MB of heap. On a multi-tenant deployment, set the cap to the smallest value your largest legitimate attachment needs.
• Attachments are base64-encoded over JSON-RPC, which inflates payload size by ~33%. A 100 MB binary becomes ~134 MB on the wire.
• 413 is returned as soon as we can detect the overrun — either from Content-Length upfront (no body drain) or mid-stream once accumulated bytes exceed the cap. Chunked uploads without Content-Length still get capped via the streaming check.
• Reverse proxies have their own limits. Nginx defaults to client_max_body_size 1m; bump it (client_max_body_size 600m; or similar) or large requests die at the proxy with 413 before they reach this server. Caddy has no default cap.

Reverse-proxy (TLS termination)

Caddy — simplest setup, automatic Let's Encrypt:

mcp.example.com {
    # preserve the client's Authorization + X-Trilium-* headers (default behavior)
    reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3000 {
        # SSE needs large/indefinite response buffering disabled
        flush_interval -1
    }
}

nginx — explicit SSE tuning:

server {
    listen 443 ssl http2;
    server_name mcp.example.com;
    # ssl_certificate / ssl_certificate_key configured elsewhere

    location / {
        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3000;
        proxy_http_version 1.1;
        proxy_set_header Host $host;
        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;

        # SSE essentials
        proxy_set_header Connection "";
        proxy_buffering off;
        proxy_cache off;
        proxy_read_timeout 24h;
    }
}

Make sure the proxy passes through Authorization, X-Trilium-Url, X-Trilium-Token. Both examples above do by default.

Health check

GET /health returns {"status":"ok"} with no auth required. Used by the Docker HEALTHCHECK; also useful for load-balancer probes.

Security model

• Gateway auth (who can connect at all) is an operator-issued shared bearer token. Constant-time comparison, tokens stored as SHA-256 hashes at startup.
• Backend auth (which Trilium to talk to) is each client's own ETAPI token. It's only ever used to construct that client's TriliumClient; it's never logged.
• Creds are validated at connect time with a 10-second timeout, so a bad or slow Trilium target fails the SSE handshake instead of hanging the connection.
• No TLS in-process. Use a reverse proxy. The server listens on plain HTTP and expects to run behind one.
• Per-principal identity is available via --gateway-auth jwt (above). When you need to attribute actions to specific users, prefer JWT over a shared bearer token — the authenticated principal threads automatically into audit logs and (opt-in) into per-principal metric labels.

Troubleshooting

Connection immediately returns 401 unauthorized. Missing or malformed Authorization: Bearer. Check your client logs — some MCP clients strip non-standard headers on SSE.

Connection returns 401 trilium_auth_failed. The ETAPI token was rejected by Trilium. Test it directly: curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" https://trilium.example.com/etapi/app-info.

Connection returns 400 url_rejected with reason=private_address. You're pointing at a private/loopback IP (common in homelabs). Either add the hostname to --trilium-url-allowlist or pass --allow-private-urls.

Connection returns 504 trilium_validate_timeout. getAppInfo didn't respond within 10 seconds. Usually a DNS black hole, a firewall dropping packets, or Trilium is actually down.

Connection succeeds but tool calls hang. Reverse proxy is buffering SSE. Verify proxy_buffering off (nginx) / flush_interval -1 (Caddy).

/health returns 200 but clients get 502/504 from the proxy. Proxy can reach the MCP server, but the server can't reach Trilium from its own network namespace (e.g., Docker bridge vs. host). Check docker exec triliumnext-mcp wget -qO- http://trilium:8080/etapi/app-info.

Debugging with MCP Inspector

MCP Inspector provides a web UI for testing tools interactively:

TRILIUM_URL=http://localhost:37740/etapi TRILIUM_TOKEN=your-token npm run inspector

Opens at http://localhost:6274 where you can browse tools, execute calls, and inspect responses.

Development

Prerequisites

• Node.js 20+
• npm
• Docker (for integration tests)

Setup

npm install          # Install dependencies
npm run build        # Build TypeScript
npm test             # Run unit tests
npm run test:integration  # Run integration tests (starts Trilium in Docker)
npm run lint         # Run linter
npm run format       # Format code

Docker

Start Trilium and the MCP server:

TRILIUM_TOKEN=your-token docker compose up -d

Build the Docker image:

docker build -t triliumnext-mcp .

Getting an ETAPI Token

1. Open TriliumNext in your browser
2. Go to Options (gear icon) → ETAPI
3. Create a new ETAPI token
4. Copy the token and use it in your configuration

License

MIT