proxykey MCP server

Issue, rotate and revoke API-key passes from your AI agent — without the agent ever seeing a real key.

proxykey is a credential vault and proxy: your real API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Telegram, Stripe, 25+ providers) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM and never leave the server. Apps and agents use revocable virtual keys — passes (vlt_…) — with per-pass IP binding, rate limits and full request logs. This MCP server lets an agent manage those passes.

• Website: https://proxykey.org/en/
• Panel: https://app.proxykey.org
• Docs: https://app.proxykey.org/docs.html
• MCP endpoint (Streamable HTTP): https://mcp.proxykey.org/mcp

Why give an agent this instead of a key

Anything that enters a model's context can leak — through logs, traces or prompt injection. With proxykey the agent gets a tool, not a secret:

• the agent can create / rotate / revoke / inspect passes;
• a "read the real key" operation does not exist in the toolset;
• only a human can enter the original key, in the panel;
• a leaked pass is a non-event: wrong IP → 403, over limit → 429, revocation is one click and doesn't touch the original.

Quick start

1. Sign in at https://app.proxykey.org (GitHub OAuth or email magic link, free).
2. Open MCP → create a token (mcp_…).
3. Connect your client:

Claude Code

claude mcp add --transport http proxykey https://mcp.proxykey.org/mcp \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer mcp_YOUR_TOKEN"

Claude Desktop / Cursor (mcp.json)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proxykey": {
      "url": "https://mcp.proxykey.org/mcp",
      "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer mcp_YOUR_TOKEN" }
    }
  }
}

Tools (13)

Tool	What it does
list_providers	Provider catalogue (slugs, auth models)
list_secrets	Stored keys (metadata only — never values)
get_manual_secret_setup	Link for a human to enter a key
list_passes	All passes with status, limits, binding
create_pass	Issue a pass for an existing secret
create_pending_pass	Issue a pass before the key exists; a human fills the key in later, the pass activates automatically
update_pass	Change limits, IP mode, expiry
revoke_pass / delete_pass	Kill a pass instantly / remove a revoked one
rotate_pass	Reissue the token, same settings
rebind_pass_ip	Reset IP learning
get_pass_logs / get_pass_stats	Per-pass request log and usage stats

The proxy itself

Point your client at the proxy and use the pass as the API key — only the host and the key change:

# before
curl https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-..."
# after
curl https://api.proxykey.org/p/openai/v1/chat/completions -H "Authorization: Bearer vlt_openai_..."

Streaming (SSE), request bodies and headers pass through unchanged. Telegram bots keep their URL shape (/p/telegram-bot/<pass>/getMe). Full reference: https://app.proxykey.org/docs.html

Security model (short version)

• Secrets: AES-256-GCM envelope encryption, decrypted in memory per request, never logged, never returned by any API after creation.
• Pass tokens and MCP tokens are stored hashed (SHA-256).
• MCP surface cannot create or read secret values, or toggle body logging — those stay human-only in the panel.
• Request logs contain metadata only — no auth headers, no key material.