Groundhog
Safe, self-hosted MCP server for web grounding that fetches live pages through a stealth-patched Chrome and returns clean Markdown with provenance, preventing SSRF and blocks.
README
Groundhog
Safe, self-hosted web grounding for AI agents and crawlers. Groundhog is an MCP server that fetches live web pages through a real, stealth-patched Chrome (over CDP) and returns clean Markdown with provenance — without the SSRF holes of plain fetchers and without getting blocked like plain HTTP clients.
agent / crawler ──MCP──▶ Groundhog (search, read_url, research) ──CDP──▶ stealth Chrome ──▶ the web
Quick start
Add Groundhog to your MCP client — that's it. On the first read_url, Groundhog pulls and
starts the stealth-browser container for you (Docker or Podman required); no repo checkout,
no manual steps.
Claude Desktop / Cursor / Windsurf (claude_desktop_config.json or equivalent):
{
"mcpServers": {
"groundhog": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["groundhog-mcp"]
}
}
}
uvx fetches groundhog-mcp from PyPI on first run. The first fetch pulls the browser
image (once, a few minutes); later fetches are instant. No container runtime? The status
tool and any error say how to install one — or point CDP_URL at a hosted browser for
zero-install use.
Prefer to manage the browser yourself? Start it and Groundhog will just use it:
docker run -d --rm -p 127.0.0.1:9222:9222 ghcr.io/dmytrome/groundhog:latest
# or, from a repo checkout: docker compose up --build -d
curl -s http://localhost:9222/json/version # CDP is live
Set GROUNDHOG_AUTO_START_BROWSER=false to disable auto-start. To run the MCP server from
source: cd mcp && uv sync && uv run groundhog-mcp.
Tools
read_url(url, format="markdown", max_tokens=None, query=None, include_hidden=False)
Fetches a page and returns clean content plus provenance.
| Key | Meaning |
|---|---|
markdown |
Extracted content (article-first, falls back to full text); format may be markdown or text |
title |
Page title |
url |
The URL you asked for |
final_url |
The URL after redirects (re-checked against the SSRF guard) |
fetched_at |
UTC ISO-8601 timestamp |
truncated |
Whether the content was cut to fit the token budget |
threats |
Hidden-text signals detected (signal type + excerpt per node); empty list when none found |
matches |
When query is set: ranked passages with heading, offset, and score for citation |
provenance |
Content hash, canonical URL, language, word count, and author/date metadata when present |
Because Groundhog renders a real DOM, it can evaluate computed styles. Text invisible to
humans is stripped by default and each occurrence reported in threats with its signal
type and a short excerpt: display:none/visibility:hidden, opacity ≤ 0.05,
font-size < 4 px, zero-size elements, the sub-pixel box used by .sr-only/
.visually-hidden accessibility utility classes (a pattern attackers now mimic), the legacy
clip: rect(...) hiding technique, text-color transparency or matching the background color
(near-1:1 contrast), and elements positioned entirely outside the rendered page (e.g.
left: -9999px). Non-trivial HTML comments are reported too — they never reach the
extracted content either way, but a page embedding instructions this way is worth knowing
about. Pass include_hidden=True to keep the stripped text in the output; threats is
still populated so you know it was there. Pass query to
replace blunt head-truncation with relevance-ranked passage selection: content is chunked
on markdown structure, ranked by lexical (BM25) relevance, and the top passages within the
token budget are returned; matches gives each passage's heading, character offset, and
score for downstream citation. Ranking runs on sanitized content, so hidden-text injection
payloads cannot influence which passages surface.
search(query, limit=10)
Finds pages for a query and returns ranked hits — title, url, snippet, engine,
score, published — plus the backend that answered. Hits are links only: nothing is
fetched until you pass a URL to read_url.
Two backends, chosen automatically. Set SEARXNG_URL to use your own
SearXNG instance (best results; needs formats: [html, json]
in its settings.yml, since JSON is off by default upstream). With no instance configured,
Groundhog renders a search page through the stealth browser instead — no extra
infrastructure, at the cost of depending on that page's layout. Force one with
GROUNDHOG_SEARCH_BACKEND=searxng|serp.
Hit titles and snippets are attacker-influenceable — a poisoned page controls how it describes itself — so they pass through the same invisible-character stripping as page content. A backend that is unreachable, has JSON disabled, or whose every upstream engine is rate-limited raises an actionable error rather than reporting an empty web.
research(query, max_sources=5, max_tokens=None)
One call for "find out about X": searches, reads the top sources through the stealth
browser, and returns the passages most relevant to query — ranked across all sources
in a single pass, so a passage from source 4 competes fairly with one from source 1.
Returns passages (each with text, source_url, heading, score) and sources (each
with url, title, status, threats, provenance). At most one page per registrable
domain, for source diversity. Passages are extracts, not summaries — nothing is generated,
and no model or API key is involved. When a passage isn't enough, read_url its
source_url for the whole page.
A source that fails doesn't fail the call: it appears in sources with a status of
blocked (SSRF guard), timeout, or error, so a partial answer is still usable and you
can see what was missed. Because search results are chosen by a third party — and
SEO-poisoned results are a documented in-the-wild attack — every fetched URL goes through
the same SSRF guard and hidden-text stripping as read_url, and each source reports what
was stripped from it.
It's slower than an API-backed research tool: a real browser renders every source. That's the trade for reading pages that block plain fetchers, and for being able to tell you what was hidden in them.
status()
Reports whether Groundhog can reach the stealth browser. Returns browser_reachable,
cdp_url, and a hint with remediation steps when it isn't reachable.
Configuration
MCP server (mcp/):
| Env var | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
CDP_URL |
http://127.0.0.1:9222 |
CDP endpoint of the stealth browser. May be remote (a DNS name or IP); auto-start is skipped for non-local values. The endpoint is unauthenticated — keep it on a private network or a tunnel. |
GROUNDHOG_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS |
true |
Enforce the SSRF guard (resolve + block private ranges) |
GROUNDHOG_MIN_DELAY_MS |
5000 |
Minimum delay between requests to the same domain |
GROUNDHOG_MAX_TOKENS |
20000 |
Token budget before truncation |
GROUNDHOG_MAX_CONCURRENT_PAGES |
4 |
Cap on concurrent open tabs |
SEARXNG_URL |
(unset) | Your SearXNG instance for search, e.g. http://searxng:8080. Needs formats: [html, json]. Unset → SERP via the stealth browser. |
GROUNDHOG_SEARCH_BACKEND |
auto |
auto (SearXNG when SEARXNG_URL is set, else SERP), or force searxng / serp |
GROUNDHOG_AUTO_START_BROWSER |
true |
Auto-pull-and-run the browser container when it isn't reachable (needs Docker/Podman); false to manage it yourself |
GROUNDHOG_BROWSER_IMAGE |
ghcr.io/dmytrome/groundhog:latest |
Image used for auto-start |
GROUNDHOG_COMPOSE_FILE |
(none) | Use docker compose -f <file> up -d for auto-start instead of docker run (local repo) |
Dependencies: py3langid (which pulls in numpy) is used for language detection in the
provenance result. It is installed in the MCP server package only — not in the browser
container.
Browser container:
| Env var | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
USER_AGENT |
derived from installed Chrome | UA set at launch, so it is clean in every scope including workers |
PROXY |
(none) | Upstream proxy (http://user:pass@host:port); auth is relayed and timezone/locale auto-align to the exit IP |
TZ |
UTC |
Fallback timezone; auto-derived from the exit IP when PROXY is set |
WINDOW_SIZE |
1920,1080 |
Initial Chrome window size |
XVFB_WHD |
1920x1080x24 |
Virtual display geometry |
Why Groundhog
- Safe by default. The SSRF guard resolves the host and blocks loopback, RFC-1918
private, link-local (incl.
169.254.169.254), reserved, multicast, unspecified, CGNAT100.64.0.0/10, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 — and re-checks the URL after redirects. Onlyhttp/https, no credentials in URLs. Read-only, per-domain rate limiting. - No automation tell. Puppeteer/Playwright/Selenium enable the CDP
Runtimedomain, which anti-bots detect (isAutomatedWithCDP). Groundhog drives the browser over raw CDP and never enablesRuntime/Console, so that signal is absent — a clean session that full automation libraries can't produce overconnect_over_cdp. - A real fingerprint. It's real Chrome, run headful under Xvfb (no
HeadlessChrometoken) — authentic TLS/HTTP2 fingerprint, real WebGL/canvas — not a Python HTTP client, so fingerprint-driven blocks go away and cheap proxies work where they otherwise wouldn't. - Self-hosted. You run the container; the pages you fetch and the content extracted from them never leave your own infrastructure.
Under the hood: the stealth Chrome container
A minimal Docker container running headful Chrome under Xvfb with a remote CDP endpoint. Any CDP-speaking client (Puppeteer, Playwright, Selenium, chromedp, raw DevTools) can drive it — Groundhog is one such client.
- Headful under Xvfb, not
--headless=new— the browser reportsChrome, notHeadlessChrome, avoids headless-specific tells, and engages the real GPU path. --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled—navigator.webdriverreadsfalse.- UA set at launch from the installed Chrome version (
USER_AGENT), so it is clean in every scope — main frame, network, and Web/Service Worker globals. - Proxy geo-coherence. When
PROXYis set, the entrypoint geolocates the exit IP and aligns the browser timezone and locale to it — a timezone or locale that disagrees with the IP is itself a block signal. The country→locale table is CLDR likely-subtags. Chrome can't authenticate to a proxy over--proxy-server, so credentials are relayed through a local tinyproxy; WebRTC is pinned to the proxy path so the real IP can't leak. - GPU-aware WebGL. The entrypoint auto-detects a GPU (NVIDIA via the Container
Toolkit, or Intel/AMD via
/dev/dri) and uses hardware acceleration; without one it runs Mesallvmpipe, a coherent software renderer that VMs and servers legitimately emit. See thegpus/deviceshints indocker-compose.yml.
Verified results
Measured against a freshly built container (Chrome 149, headful under Xvfb, no proxy), driven over raw CDP:
| Detector | Result |
|---|---|
| deviceandbrowserinfo | not a bot (isBot: false, zero flags) |
| browserscan | Normal |
| bot.sannysoft.com | 31 / 31 checks pass |
iphey is tracked informationally, not pass/fail: its one recurring
flag is Location ("looks like you're trying to hide your location"), which fires on any
datacenter/hosting exit IP regardless of browser fingerprint or TZ correctness — it
passes on a residential IP and fails in CI (a cloud runner) and behind most proxies alike.
See RESULTS.md for the full live table (regenerated by
tests/antibot.py and the Conformance workflow).
These reflect the raw-CDP client. Full automation libraries (Puppeteer/Playwright/Selenium)
enable the CDP Runtime domain and are flagged as automated even against this container —
see examples/ for which need patched (rebrowser) variants.
Examples
| Client | Path |
|---|---|
| Puppeteer (Node) | examples/puppeteer |
| Playwright (Node) | examples/playwright-node |
| Playwright (Python) | examples/playwright-python |
| Selenium (Python) | examples/selenium-python |
| chromedp (Go) | examples/go-chromedp |
| Raw CDP (Python) | examples/python-raw-cdp |
See examples/OTHER_TOOLS.md for crawl4ai, Scrapy +
Playwright, go-rod, Crawlee, and nodriver pointers.
Security
The CDP endpoint is unauthenticated — anyone who can reach the port has full control
of the browser. Bind it to localhost or a trusted private network; never expose it to the
public internet. --no-sandbox is used because Chrome's sandbox does not work in an
unprivileged container; keep the container isolated. To report a vulnerability, see
SECURITY.md.
A note on "stealth"
Best-effort, not a guarantee. It defeats common open-source detectors and lets cheap proxies work on many mid-tier targets, but it does not beat sophisticated commercial anti-bot systems that gate on IP reputation, TLS/HTTP2 fingerprints, and behavioral analysis. Use it for legitimate, authorized automation and testing.
License
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