alidocs-web-mcp
Bridges the editing capabilities of an already-open DingTalk document in the browser to any MCP host via standard stdio, forwarding tools to the page's internal MCP server over a local WebSocket. Supports read/write operations through suggested edits, pairing-based security, and zero runtime dependencies.
README
alidocs-web-mcp
Let your AI agent read and edit the DingTalk Doc you already have open — in your own browser, under your own login, with every change landing as a suggestion you approve or discard.
Why this exists
You are editing a document in your browser. Your AI agent lives somewhere else — an IDE, a terminal, a desktop app. To let the agent help, you normally have two bad options:
| Option | Why it falls short |
|---|---|
| Server-side document API | Cannot express block-level suggestions awaiting human review, and needs its own credentials and permission plumbing |
| Give the agent its own browser | Splits your session in two: the document you are looking at is not the document the agent drives |
The capability you actually want — structured, block-level editing that renders as a reviewable suggestion — only exists inside the page runtime. So instead of recreating it elsewhere, this tool connects your agent to the page you already have open.
The direction is inverted on purpose. The page dials out to a local process; the local process never reaches into your browser. That is what makes it work without debug ports, browser extensions, or any change to your agent's host application.
What you get
- Standard MCP over stdio — works with any MCP host (IDE, terminal, desktop agent). No custom protocol to adopt.
- Zero runtime dependencies — plain Node ≥ 18, hand-rolled WebSocket framing.
npxand go. - Zero code injection — the pairing credential is data, never a script. Nothing is ever
eval'd. - Read-only by default — writes require an explicit flag, and land as suggestions rather than saved edits.
- Loopback only — binds
127.0.0.1, enforces an Origin allowlist, and authenticates with an HMAC challenge-response.
Requirements
[!IMPORTANT] This bridge is half of a pair. The document page must ship a matching connector that discovers the bridge and initiates pairing. Without it, the bridge starts fine but no document tools will ever appear.
As of now that connector is not yet generally available in production DingTalk Docs. If
get_bridge_statuskeeps reportingconnected: falsewhile the bridge is clearly running, this is almost certainly why — not a misconfiguration on your side.
- Node.js ≥ 18
- A DingTalk Doc page open in a browser, with the page-side connector present
Install & run
Register it with your MCP host — no global install needed:
{
"mcpServers": {
"alidocs-web-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "alidocs-web-mcp", "--allow-write"]
}
}
}
Or run it directly:
npx -y alidocs-web-mcp # read-only
npx -y alidocs-web-mcp --allow-write # allow the page to register write tools
The bridge tries ports 19837 → 19838 → 19839 and takes the first free one. The page discovers it by probing those same ports, which is why they are fixed rather than random.
How pairing works
Three steps, and the agent can drive all of them:
- Call
get_pairing_code→ you get a pairing code (a string of data) and the port. - Put that code into the page's "local agent" pairing field — the agent can type and click it, or you can paste it yourself.
- The page completes an HMAC handshake. From then on
tools/listincludes the document tools.
After a refresh or same-tab navigation, the page reconnects automatically using the code it kept in sessionStorage. No re-pairing.
Architecture
flowchart LR
subgraph outside["Outside the browser"]
host["MCP host<br/>(IDE / terminal / desktop agent)"]
bridge["alidocs-web-mcp<br/>pairing + dumb pipe"]
end
subgraph browser["Your browser, your login"]
page["Document page<br/>MCP server + tools"]
doc["Document<br/>suggestion state"]
end
host <-->|"stdio · standard MCP"| bridge
page -->|"1 · discover: GET /health"| bridge
page <-->|"2 · ws://127.0.0.1 · HMAC handshake<br/>3 · JSON-RPC passthrough"| bridge
page --> doc
classDef trust fill:#eef7ff,stroke:#4b86c9
classDef local fill:#f6f6f6,stroke:#999
class browser trust
class outside local
Two properties worth noting:
- The page always initiates. The bridge only listens on loopback; it never dials into the browser.
- The bridge is a dumb pipe. Beyond its own three tools, it merges
tools/listand forwardstools/callverbatim. It does not understand document semantics — so the page can add tools without changing the bridge.
Data flow
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant H as MCP host
participant B as alidocs-web-mcp
participant P as Document page
participant D as Document
Note over B: bind 127.0.0.1, generate a per-session pairing code (CSPRNG)
H->>B: tools/call get_pairing_code
B-->>H: pairingCode + port (data, never a script)
P->>B: GET /health on 19837/38/39
B-->>P: { service, originAllowed, ... }
Note over H,P: the code reaches the page via UI (typed or pasted)
P->>B: WS upgrade (Origin checked here → 403 if not allowed)
B-->>P: challenge { nonce }
P->>B: auth { mac = HMAC-SHA256(pairingCode, nonce) }
B-->>P: ready { sessionId }
B->>H: notifications/tools/list_changed
H->>B: tools/call read_document
B->>P: forwarded verbatim (id remapped)
P->>D: read
D-->>P: content
P-->>B: result
B-->>H: result
H->>B: tools/call update_block
B->>P: forwarded verbatim
P->>D: write as a suggestion (not saved)
Note over D: you approve or discard it
The pairing code itself is never transmitted — only HMAC(code, nonce) is. Someone who squats the port and captures the mac still cannot recover the code.
Bridge tools
Everything else you see in tools/list comes from the page; the bridge only forwards it.
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
get_pairing_code |
Returns the pairing code (data) plus the port and write-permission state. Never returns a script. |
get_bridge_status |
Port, whether a page is paired, whether its MCP session is ready, in-flight requests, Origin allowlist, audit log path. Start here when a call fails. |
revoke_session |
Rotates the pairing code and drops the session. Anything the page stored becomes invalid immediately. |
CLI options
| Flag | Meaning |
|---|---|
--port <n> |
Use only this port instead of the candidate set |
--allow-origin <pattern> |
Append an allowlist entry (repeatable); * matches a single label or port, never across . : / |
--only-origin <pattern> |
Replace the default allowlist entirely |
--allow-write |
Allow the page to register write tools (read-only otherwise) |
--audit-log <path> / --no-audit |
Audit log location, default ~/.alidocs-web-mcp/audit.log |
--handshake-timeout-ms <n> |
Handshake deadline, default 10000 |
--request-timeout-ms <n> |
Timeout for requests forwarded to the page, default 60000 |
The default allowlist contains only the official document origins plus local dev hosts, enumerated one by one. There is deliberately no wildcard like https://*.dingtalk.com — that would let any subdomain reach your local bridge.
Security posture
This tool opens a listening port on your machine, so it is worth being explicit. Four attack directions, each with its own defence:
| Direction | Defence |
|---|---|
| A malicious web page → your local bridge | Loopback-only bind plus an Origin allowlist enforced during the WS upgrade (403 before any state changes) |
| A malicious local process → the bridge | A per-session CSPRNG pairing code. Origin headers can be forged by non-browser clients; the code cannot be guessed |
| A local impostor squatting the port → your page | HMAC challenge-response, so the code never goes over the wire; plus port-contention detection |
| A poisoned distribution or prompt injection → your page | Credentials travel as data, never as code; read-only by default; writes only ever become suggestions |
Also: /health responses are tiered by Origin (outsiders cannot read connected or allowWrite), one session at a time, and the audit log records tool names and argument keys — never argument values or the pairing code.
Full threat model and the S1–S13 control list: docs/security.md. Reporting a vulnerability: SECURITY.md.
Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Likely cause |
|---|---|
tools/list only shows the three bridge tools |
No page is paired yet. Run get_pairing_code and complete pairing. |
get_bridge_status shows connected: false forever |
The page has no connector (see Requirements), or the page is on an origin outside the allowlist. |
ORIGIN_REJECTED |
Your document origin is not allowlisted. Add it with --allow-origin. |
PORT_CONTENDED |
All three candidate ports are taken. Free one, or pass --port. |
AUTH_FAILED right after a bridge restart |
Expected: restarting rotates the code. Pair again with the fresh one. |
PAGE_DISCONNECTED mid-call |
The page navigated or refreshed. It reconnects on its own; retry the call. |
PAGE_TIMEOUT |
The page did not answer within --request-timeout-ms. |
Development
npm install # dev deps only (typescript, @types/node)
npm run build # tsc → dist/ (CommonJS + .d.ts)
npm test # runs against dist/ — i.e. against what actually ships
npm run verify # build + test
npm run typecheck # tsc --noEmit
Source is TypeScript under src/; the published artifact is compiled CommonJS in dist/. Tests stay in plain JavaScript on purpose — they exercise the built output rather than the sources, so the thing being verified is the thing being published. Because the bridge uses a fixed port set, tests run serially.
Downstream projects can build contract tests against a real bridge process:
const { startTestBridge, connectFakePage } = require('alidocs-web-mcp/test-helpers');
See CONTRIBUTING.md and AGENT.md (the latter lists constraints that must not be violated, e.g. "never return executable code").
Project status
Early (0.x). Verified today:
- 49 automated tests over the compiled artifact
- 12 Origin bypass attempts (subdomain suffixing, full-URL-in-Origin, trailing dot, case variants, scheme downgrade,
null, missing, port injection, backslash confusion) all rejected at the real upgrade path - Business messages sent before the handshake are rejected and the socket closed
- Cross-implementation HMAC agreement with the page side, pinned by shared test vectors
Not yet verified: a real MCP host consuming this server end to end. Development so far used a purpose-built minimal MCP client, which also means the notifications/tools/list_changed path — how a host learns that document tools appeared after pairing — has only been covered by automated tests with a fake host, not observed against a real one.
Documentation
- docs/design.md — design, trade-offs, and the three couplings you cannot separate
- docs/security.md — threat model and control list
- AGENT.md — conventions for AI agents working on this repo
- CHANGELOG.md
License
Recommended Servers
playwright-mcp
A Model Context Protocol server that enables LLMs to interact with web pages through structured accessibility snapshots without requiring vision models or screenshots.
Magic Component Platform (MCP)
An AI-powered tool that generates modern UI components from natural language descriptions, integrating with popular IDEs to streamline UI development workflow.
Audiense Insights MCP Server
Enables interaction with Audiense Insights accounts via the Model Context Protocol, facilitating the extraction and analysis of marketing insights and audience data including demographics, behavior, and influencer engagement.
VeyraX MCP
Single MCP tool to connect all your favorite tools: Gmail, Calendar and 40 more.
graphlit-mcp-server
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server enables integration between MCP clients and the Graphlit service. Ingest anything from Slack to Gmail to podcast feeds, in addition to web crawling, into a Graphlit project - and then retrieve relevant contents from the MCP client.
Kagi MCP Server
An MCP server that integrates Kagi search capabilities with Claude AI, enabling Claude to perform real-time web searches when answering questions that require up-to-date information.
Neon Database
MCP server for interacting with Neon Management API and databases
E2B
Using MCP to run code via e2b.
Exa Search
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server lets AI assistants like Claude use the Exa AI Search API for web searches. This setup allows AI models to get real-time web information in a safe and controlled way.
Qdrant Server
This repository is an example of how to create a MCP server for Qdrant, a vector search engine.